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Conservative distrust of scientists regarding climate 
change and evolution has been widely expressed in 
public pronouncements and surveys, contributing to 
impressions that conservatives are less likely to trust 
scientists in general. But what about other topics, where 
some liberals have expressed misgivings too? Nuclear 
power safety, vaccinations, and genetically modi-
fied organisms (GMOs) are three often-mentioned 
examples. For this report, five similarly worded survey 
questions were designed to test the hypothesis that, 
depending on the issue, liberals are just as likely to 
reject science as conservatives. The five questions were 
included along with many unrelated items in telephone 
surveys of over 1,000 New Hampshire residents.
As expected, liberals were most likely and con-
servatives least likely to say that they trust scientists 
for information about climate change or evolution. 
Contrary to the topic-bias hypothesis, however, liber-
als also were most likely and conservatives least likely 
to trust scientists for information about vaccines, 
nuclear power safety, and GMOs. Liberal–conserva-
tive gaps on these questions ranged from 55 points 
(climate change) to 24 points (nuclear power), but 
always in the same direction. These results pose a 
challenge for some common explanations of political 
polarization in views about science.
Introduction
Scientists are in strong agreement that human activi-
ties, by altering the composition of Earth’s atmosphere, 
are changing the climate and pushing it in directions 
that we probably won’t like. Research showing evidence 
of anthropogenic (human-caused) climate change 
has been reviewed in detail for a series of reports by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change1 and 
supported in statements by all of the leading organizations 
of scientists.2 Independently conducted surveys of climate 
scientists3 and analyses of published scientific reports4 
find over 95 percent agreement on the existence of this 
problem. This strong consensus among scientists comes 
through clearly in discussions at professional meetings and 
in new research papers published each month.
In contrast to the high level of agreement among 
scientists, opinions among the U.S. public and politi-
cians vary widely, largely along partisan lines.5 Survey 
researchers find that climate-change questions are some 
of the most divisive ones they ask.6 Majorities of liber-
als and moderates, but relatively few conservatives, 
accept the scientific consensus that human activities are 
changing Earth’s climate.7 Similar divisions appear on 
questions asking whether people believe there even is 
a climate-change consensus among scientists.8 Liberals 
and moderates, who tend to agree with the scientists 
about climate change, also more often say they trust 
scientists for information on this topic. Conservatives, 
who tend to reject the scientific consensus, also are less 
inclined to say they trust scientists. In Congress, some 
conservative leaders have denounced climate studies as 
a “hoax” and have sought to defund research activities, 
including the use of satellites to study the Earth.9
claims that liberals disproportionately reject science on 
vaccines in the same way that conservatives do on climate.
Neither the vaccine nor the climate change survey 
question asks what people believe on these topics, but 
simply whether they trust scientists as a source of infor-
mation. Science is a process for systematically learning 
about causes and effects, and the emerging knowledge 
about vaccines is a case in point. An Institute of Medicine 
review of scientific research on vaccines, for example, 
found many instances in which fears of side effects 
appeared unfounded, such as the alleged link between 
measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccination and 
autism, but also noted instances in which genuine risks 
were identified or the evidence remained too limited for 
conclusions.14 Studies of individuals who express distrust 
of scientists regarding vaccines have found them more 
likely to credit information from non-science sources, 
however, such as websites or people they know.15
Similar observations could apply to nuclear power 
safety and GMOs. Both are important topics that draw 
scientific attention, resulting in an extensive and diverse 
record of research. However, both have also been topics 
of controversy among the general public. Liberal misgiv-
ings about nuclear power and GMOs are well known, 
but our question here is different: is there evidence that 
liberals disproportionately tend to distrust scientists, and 
favor other sources instead, when it comes to evaluat-
ing the risks and benefits in these publicly controversial 
areas? In this brief, we test that hypothesis, and extend 
the earlier climate change/vaccines comparison, using 
data from more than 1,000 new survey interviews.
Do You Trust Scientists for Information 
About...?
The Granite State Poll, run by the Survey Center at 
the University of New Hampshire, conducts cell and 
landline telephone interviews with random samples of 
state residents four times each year. Although many of 
its questions seek political opinions, the poll provides a 
platform for research on other topics as well.16
The poll recently asked five “trust scientists” ques-
tions (see Box 1). Two of these, on climate change and 
vaccines, were discussed in an earlier paper17 that used 
data from New Hampshire surveys conducted in July 
and October 2014 and a separate survey from Oregon. 
In comparing responses across political parties, the 
paper found that Democrats were most likely and Tea 
Liberal misgivings about nuclear power and GMOs 
are well known, but our question here is different: 
is there evidence that liberals disproportionately 
tend to distrust scientists, and favor other sources 
instead, when it comes to evaluating the risks and 
benefits in these publicly controversial areas? 
Conservative distrust of science on climate change 
illustrates a broader phenomenon of ideology-based 
rejection that has been examined by many recent 
studies.10 Some other prominent examples such as 
evolution also involve mainly conservative opposi-
tion. Researchers and political analysts have looked for 
examples of bias going the opposite direction, where 
liberals rather than conservatives disproportionately 
express distrust of scientists or reject a clear scientific 
consensus. Evidence for opposite bias has been found 
in experiments11 in which information was controlled—
such as reading a paragraph that makes a scientific 
claim. Real-world examples of major domains in which 
a scientific consensus was disproportionately rejected 
by liberals are harder to identify, but three main pos-
sibilities have been suggested: vaccinations, nuclear 
power safety, and GMOs. Evidence that liberals are 
disproportionately biased against science on these top-
ics has been anecdotal, however.12
One recent paper tested for topic biases by compar-
ing results from two survey questions that asked people 
whether they trust scientists for information about climate 
change or about vaccines.13 As expected, trust in scientists 
regarding climate change was higher among Democrats 
and independents and lowest among Tea Party supporters. 
Unexpectedly, trust in scientists regarding vaccines was 
also higher among Democrats and independents and low-
est among Tea Party supporters. These findings go against 
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Party supporters least likely to say they trust scientists 
for information on either climate change or vaccines.
This brief broadens that analysis using additional data. 
Two New Hampshire surveys conducted in April and 
July 2015 asked new questions regarding trust in scien-
tists for information about nuclear power safety, evolu-
tion, and GMOs.18 In addition to comparison by political 
party, this brief compares attitudes by self-described 
political ideology. 
Responses to all five questions are graphed as bar 
charts in Figure 1. Each chart also notes the number 
of respondents (n) who were asked that question. A 
large majority (71 percent) of the 2,489 respondents 
FIGURE 1. TRUST IN SCIENTISTS AS SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON FIVE ISSUES
Note: N = number of respondants. Confidence intervals for these weighted percentages are within plus or minus 3 percentage points.
Would you say that you trust, don’t trust, or are 




•	 Nuclear power safety
•	 Evolution
•	 Genetically modified organisms (GMOs)
(The order of “trust” and “don’t trust” choices read 
by interviewers was rotated to avoid bias.)
Box 1. Questions About Trust in Scientists
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who were asked the vaccine question said they trust 
scientists for information on this topic (first panel). 
Majorities also trust scientists regarding climate change 
(62 percent), nuclear power safety (69 percent), and 
evolution (63 percent). In each of these cases, less than 
20 percent said they do not trust scientists.
Regarding GMOs, the level of trust drops below 
half (47 percent), while distrust edges a bit higher (21 
percent). These GMO responses do not necessarily 
indicate a dimmer view of scientists, however. A previ-
ous survey asking different questions found that more 
than 40 percent of respondents said they did not know 
enough about GMOs to offer an opinion.19 Similarly, 
32 percent here said they were unsure or did not know 
about trusting scientists regarding GMOs, and some of 
the remainder with low knowledge may have said “do 
not trust,” boosting that percentage as well. Despite the 
lower familiarity associated with GMOs, we included 
this issue because it has been mentioned by some com-
mentators as an area that would show liberal bias.
With this caveat about interpreting the GMO responses, 
the Figure 1 results offer modest encouragement regarding 
public trust in scientists. The following sections explore 
how levels of trust vary with education and politics.
Education and Trust in Scientists
The earlier study mentioned above20 found that trust 
in scientists on both climate change and vaccines is 
higher among respondents with college education. The 
same holds true in this expanded dataset and extends 
to nuclear power, evolution, and GMOs (Figure 2). For 
each of the five topics, the percentage who said they 
trust scientists for information rises with education, 
FIGURE 2. TRUST IN SCIENTISTS, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF RESPONDENT
Note: Number of respondents (n) and significance test probabilities (p) are given within each chart. In general, a p value below 0.05 (five chances in a hundred) is 
considered significant, meaning there can be reasonable confidence a relationship exists in the larger population (New Hampshire adults) from which these random 
samples were drawn. The probabilities here are much lower, below 0.001 or one chance in 1,000.
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producing a 23- to 34-point spread between respondents 
with a high school education or less and those with post-
graduate education. Regarding vaccines, the percent-
age rises from 57 to 80 percent, on climate from 50 to 
74 percent, on evolution from 48 to 77 percent, and on 
GMOs from 31 to 65 percent. All education/trust rela-
tionships depicted in Figure 2 are statistically significant, 
as indicated by the probabilities (p) given in each chart.21
Partisan Divisions on Vaccines and 
Climate Change
Figure 3 employs the four-party classification from the 
study cited above22 to track partisan differences over 
time in attitudes about vaccines and climate change. 
Combining the results from the earlier study with our 
expanded dataset yields four surveys that asked the vac-
cines question and five that asked about climate change. 
The up-and-down fluctuations in both plots appear 
statistically random, meaning that they fall within the 
normal variation expected from survey sampling. More 
noteworthy is their common pattern. On both questions 
across all of these surveys, Democrats expressed the most 
trust in scientists, while Tea Party supporters expressed 
the least. The views of independents and non-Tea Party 
Republicans are not as distinct from each other, a finding 
that also fits with earlier research.23
The vaccines result in the first panel of Figure 3 runs 
opposite to claims that, on this topic, liberals would be 
less likely than other groups to trust scientists. It lends 
support instead to contrary claims that across diverse 
science topics where there has been public controversy, 
FIGURE 3. TRUSTS IN SCIENTISTS ON VACCINES AND CLIMATE CHANGE, BY POLITICAL IDENTIFICATION OF RESPONDENT
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liberals are more likely and conservatives less likely to 
trust scientific evidence. However, Figure 3 involves 
only two questions. The next section examines all five 
of the trust-scientists items and compares them by 
liberal to conservative ideology instead of by party.
Political Ideology and Trust in Scientists
The Granite State Poll routinely asks respondents to 
place themselves on a nine-point scale from extremely 
liberal to extremely conservative, with moderate (lean-
ing neither way) in the center. Although the original 
version of this scale has nine categories, analysis sug-
gests that in practice some of these are not very differ-
ent. For example, the distinction between “moderate, 
leaning a little more toward the conservative side” (six 
FIGURE 4. TRUST IN SCIENTISTS, BY IDEOLOGY OF RESPONDENT
Note: The number of respondents (n) and significance test probabilities (p) are given within each chart. In every case, the relationships are statistically significant, yielding 
p values below 0.001.
on the scale where five is plain moderate) and “some-
what conservative” (seven) does not seem to be sharp 
in many people’s minds, judging by the similar answers 
these two groups give to other questions. For our pur-
poses it makes sense to use a simpler scheme with just 
five categories: liberal, moderately liberal, moderate, 
moderately conservative, or conservative.24
Figure 4 breaks down the percentage of trust-scientists 
responses by ideology. Most of the ideology/trust relation-
ships charted in Figure 4 are stronger than the education/
trust relationships charted in Figure 2. On topics from 
vaccines to GMOs, liberals are most likely and conserva-
tives least likely to say they trust scientists for information. 
For example, 87 percent of liberals, 74 percent of moder-
ates, and 56 percent of conservatives say that they trust 
scientists for information about vaccines. Eighty-three 
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percent of liberals, 69 percent of moderates, and 59 per-
cent of conservatives say they trust scientists for informa-
tion about nuclear power safety. Seventy-three percent 
of liberals, 46 percent of moderates, and just 31 percent 
of conservatives say they trust scientists for information 
about GMOs. Moderate liberals and moderate conserva-
tives fill the spaces in between. 
The vaccines, nuclear power, and GMO questions 
were specifically chosen to test whether on those topics 
liberals would be more inclined than conservatives 
to reject science. In fact, the proportion of liberals 
expressing trust in scientists is almost the same for 
vaccines as it is for climate change, and not much lower 
for nuclear power. Conservatives’ trust ranges from 24 
to 55 points lower than liberals’ trust across all five sci-
ence domains. These results overturn the proposition 
that with this selection of topics we would find oppo-
site and similarly strong ideological biases slanting 
in both directions. If such opposite biases exist, their 
effects are relatively weak, limited to narrowing the 
liberal-conservative gap on some issues.
Discussion
The content of particular science domains undoubt-
edly affects public perceptions. Some authors go 
a step further to argue that topical science-trust 
questions (for example, whether you trust scientists 
on climate change, or on nuclear power) basically 
measure the same thing as questions asking about 
your general attitudes regarding that topic.25 Others 
have noted theory and data supporting the idea that 
economic or policy implications associated with 
particular science domains affect how people with 
different ideologies view them. For example, liberals 
tend to be more supportive of research on the envi-
ronment, whereas conservatives prefer research that 
supports economic production.26 Both the domain-
attitude and policy-implication theories must be 
partly true, but neither predicts the unidirectional 
pattern seen in Figure 4.
Our data include, of course, many liberals who 
distrust scientists on each topic and many conserva-
tives who do trust them. Some liberals who distrust 
scientists regarding nuclear power safety, for example, 
might be motivated by ideological or cultural rea-
soning, as are some conservatives regarding climate 
change. The proportions in these groups are quite 
different, however. Only 17 percent of liberals say 
they distrust or are unsure about scientists regarding 
nuclear power safety, compared with 66 percent of 
conservatives regarding climate change.
In a similar vein, experimental research has shown 
that both liberals and conservatives exhibit bias in 
evaluating scientific or scientific-sounding claims 
that impinge on their political and cultural beliefs.27 
Some evidence suggests such biases are more preva-
lent among conservatives, however.28 Statements 
by conservative political leaders disparaging major 
areas of science reinforce impressions from survey 
and experimental data that science rejection, while 
cutting both ways, remains more widespread on the 
right than the left. Further indications come from 
the observation that the science domains on which 
the public is most politically polarized—climate 
change and evolution—have predominantly conser-
vative opposition.
Observing that such a pattern exists does not 
explain why it exists. Contrasting liberal and con-
servative psychological characteristics have been 
proposed as one type of theoretical explanation,29 
sometimes termed the “intrinsic thesis.” In contrast, 
the more sociological “contextual thesis” attributes 
liberal/conservative differences on science to insti-
tutional and political factors, including the role of 
media.30 Cultural identity and social-group influence 
form part of the context as well.31 Judging the relative 
importance of psychological and sociological factors 
is beyond the scope of this brief. Figure 4 sketches a 
reality, however, that any theory should address.
These results overturn the proposition that with 
this selection of topics we would find opposite 
and similarly strong ideological biases slanting in 
both directions. If such opposite biases exist, their 
effects are relatively weak, limited to narrowing 
the liberal-conservative gap on some issues.
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